[texhax] Troubleshooting undesired page numbering restart

[Thomas Jacobs]

I am trying to understand why my page numbering restarts at page 1 in
the middle of a section.  Here is an excerpt from the calling tex
file:

\newpage
\setlength{\baselineskip}{1.5\baselineskip}
\input 1_introduction
\vspace{0.25in}
\input 2_literature
\vspace{0.25in}
\input 3_events
\vspace{0.25in}
\input 4_data_methodology
\vspace{0.25in}

where the restart occurs in the middle of input 3_events.tex right
after a very long footnote:

\textsc{Event 1:} The trouble and bailout of IKB Deutsche
Industriebank (Friday, July 27, 2007 thru Friday, August 3, 2007.)  In
what would be the first bank to nearly fail and require government
support, IKB, a small to medium size German commercial lender
acknowledged large losses from subprime investments in both direct
exposure and off balance sheet conduit funds it ran on Monday, July 30
only 10 days after claiming to have minimal exposure to U.S. Subprime
assets during an earnings call.  The size of the total exposure was
nearly \euro 20 Billion and its support exceeded the capacity of its
primary investor, publicly owned bank KfW requiring a rescue package
of government, private and public banks.  The transmission of this
information to the market as reported in the financial press was noisy
making for a difficult event window definition.  As initially reported
on July 31st, IKB would receive support from publicly owned bank KfW.
Yet on August 2nd and August 3rd details on the mechanics of the
rescue revealed a call placed on Friday, July 27th, by Josef Ackerman,
the CEO of Deutsche Bank, to the primary regulator Jochen Sanio, who
in turn contacted the Finance Minister, Peer Steinbruck, and in what
would foreshadow numerous similar crises in the U.S. a weekend of
meetings saw a rescue package composed for IKB that included support
from the government, public and private banks in the sum of \euro 3.5
Billion.  In confirmation of the delayed market response to the
events, IKB's stock fell further on August 2nd (28\%) than it had on
July 30th (19\%).%
%
\footnote{\citeasnoun{WSJ073107} note the 19\% decline in stock price
on July 30th, the unquantified subprime exposure to an off-balance
sheet vehicle called Rhineland Funding, the bailout by KfW, IKB's
largest state-owned shareholder, and KfW's 80\% ownership stake by the
German government.  It also noted that just 10 days earlier IKB had
played down its exposure during an earnings call.
\citeasnoun{FT073107} reports KfW's stake in IKB at 38\% and quotes
IKB as acknowledging that it's creditworthiness had been questioned at
the end of the prior week and indicates neither IKB nor KfW would
quantify IKB's exposure or loss to subprime markets.
\citeasnoun{Blmbg080207} and \citeasnoun{FT080207} report on August
2nd that KfW had assumed \euro 8.1 Billion in obligations to IKB's
Rhineland funding unit as announced on July 31st.  Further, this was
the first mention of government involvement orchestrated by the
Finance Minister Peer Steinbrueck (also chairman of KfW's
administrative board) the prior Sunday (July 29th) and the creation of
a rescue fund of \euro 3.5 Billion composed of KfW (70\%), Private
Banks Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank (15\%), and Public banks (15\%).
\citeasnoun{FT080307} on August 3rd reported the involvement of
Deutsche Bank's CEO Joseph Ackerman the prior Friday (July 27th) in
alerting the government regarding IKB's funding difficulties and the
large decline in IKB's stock price on August 2nd of 28\%.
\citeasnoun{FT080907} reports on August 9th that IKB revealed on
Tuesday (August 7th) that another group of banks is supplying \euro
6.5 Billion in liquidity lines to its Rhineland Funding vehicle
besides the \euro 8.1 Billion provided by KfW.  He also reports that
IKB said it had \euro 7 Billion of its own assets (at the bank level)
invested in credit portfolios the preceding March outside of its
Rhineland Funding unit with 2/3 of that in US Assets.  Including
another off balance sheet unit, Rhinebridge Funding, that it would
need to bring on balance sheet produced a direct exposure to US Assets
of \euro 6.4 Billion excluding Rhineland's \euro 14 Billion in assets.
 \citeasnoun{WSJ081007} on August 10th provide details behind the
funding problems experienced by IKB the week before its rescue.  Its
Rhineland funding unit which borrowed principally through commercial
paper to support its \euro 14 Billion in assets found itself unable to
roll over the positions and on Friday, July 27th turned to IKB to draw
on a credit line.  IKB, in turn, had a credit line with Deutsche bank
which Deutsche refused to honor.  It was at the end of this day that
Deutsche's CEO contacted the German bank regulator which led to the
weekend of negotiations.  They also report the total decline in IKB's
stock price over the two weeks of the crisis was 33\%}%
%
\textsc{Event 2:} The reduction in discount rate, the extension of
term, and the unprecedented encouragement of discount window lending
by the Federal Reserve (Friday, August 17th, 2007 thru Friday, August
24th, 2007.)  On August 17th, the Fed narrowed the fixed spread
between its target Federal Funds rate and the rate applied at the
discount window (the primary credit rate) to 50bp

NEW PAGE BEGINS HERE AND NUMBERING RESETS BACK TO PAGE 1:

from 100bp leading to a discount window decline from 6.25\% to 5.75\%.
 In addition, the typical overnight term was extended to permit term
financing of up to 30 days.%
%
\footnote{See \citeasnoun{BOARD081707} for press release.}  %

CAN ANYONE ADVISE ON HOW TO TROUBLESHOOT THIS OR FIX IT?  AM I CORRECT
IN EXAMINING WHERE THE NEW PAGE BEGINS OR DOES WHAT HAPPENS AT THE
BOTTOM OF THE NEW PAGE MATTER MORE?

Thanks,

Tom


--
Thomas Jacobs