

On the Motion of Animals

Περί ζώων κινήσεως

Aristotle

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1

Περὶ δὲ κινήσεως τῆς τῶν ζώων, ὅσα μὲν αὐτῶν περὶ ἕκαστον ὑπάρχει γένος, καὶ τίνες διαφοραί, καὶ τίνες αἰτίαι τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον συμβεβηκότων αὐτοῖς, ἐπέσκεπται περὶ ἀπάντων ἐν ἑτέροις· ὅλως δὲ περὶ τῆς κοινῆς αἰτίας τοῦ κινεῖσθαι κίνησιν ὁποιοῦν τὰ μὲν γὰρ πτήσῃ κινεῖται τὰ δὲ νεύσει τὰ δὲ πορεύῃ τῶν ζώων, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἄλλου τρόπου τοιούτου ἐπισκεπτέον νῦν.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ τῶν ἄλλων κινήσεων τὸ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν, τοῦτου δὲ τὸ ἀκίνητον, καὶ ὅτι τὸ πρῶτον κινεῖν ἀναγκαῖον ἀκίνητον εἶναι, διώρισται πρότερον, ὅτε περ καὶ περὶ κινήσεως αἰδίου, πότερον ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστι, καὶ εἰ ἔστι, τίς ἐστιν. δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ μόνον τῷ λόγῳ λαβεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, δι' ἃ περ καὶ τοὺς καθόλου ζητοῦμεν λόγῳ, καὶ ἐφ' ὧν ἐφαρμόττειν οἰόμεθα δεῖν αὐτούς. φανερόν γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων ὅτι ἀδύνατον κινεῖσθαι μηδενὸς ἡρεμοῦντος, πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ζώοις· δεῖ γάρ, ἂν κινήται τι τῶν μορίων, ἡρεμεῖν τι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο αἱ καμπαὶ τοῖς ζώοις εἰσὶν. ὥσπερ γὰρ κέντρῳ χρῶνται ταῖς καμπαῖς, καὶ γίνεται τὸ ὅλον μέρος, ἐν ᾧ ἡ καμπή, καὶ ἐν καὶ δύο, καὶ εὐθὺ καὶ κεκαμμένον, μεταβάλλον δυνάμει καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ διὰ τὴν καμπήν. καμπτομένου δὲ καὶ κινουμένου τὸ μὲν κινεῖται σημείον τὸ δὲ μένει τῶν ἐν ταῖς καμπαῖς, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τῆς διαμέτρου ἡ μὲν *A* καὶ ἡ *Δ* μένοι, ἡ δὲ *B* κινεῖτο, καὶ γίνετο ἡ *ΑΓ*. ἀλλ' ἐνταῦθα μὲν δοκεῖ πάντα τρόπον ἀδιαίρετον εἶναι τὸ κέντρον καὶ γὰρ τὸ κινεῖσθαι, ὡς φασί, πλάττουσιν ἐπ' αὐτῶν· οὐ γὰρ κινεῖσθαι τῶν μαθηματικῶν οὐδέν, τὰ δ' ἐν ταῖς καμπαῖς δυνάμει καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ γίνεται ὅτε μὲν ἐν ὅτε δὲ διαιρετά. ἀλλ' οὖν αἰεὶ ἡ ἀρχή, ἡρεμεῖ κινουμένου τοῦ μορίου τοῦ κάτωθεν, οἷον τοῦ μὲν βραχίονος κινουμένου τὸ ὠλέκρανον, ὅλου δὲ τοῦ κώλου ὁ ὦμος, καὶ τῆς μὲν κνήμης τὸ γόνυ,

ELSEWHERE we have investigated in detail the movement of animals after their various kinds, the differences between them, and the reasons for their particular characters (for some animals fly, some swim, some walk, others move in various other ways); there remains an investigation of the common ground of any sort of animal movement whatsoever.

Now we have already determined (when we were discussing whether eternal motion exists or not, and its definition, if it does exist) that the origin of all other motions is that which moves itself, and that the origin of this is the immovable, and that the prime mover must of necessity be immovable. And we must grasp this not only generally in theory, but also by reference to individuals in the world of sense, for with these in view we seek general theories, and with these we believe that general theories ought to harmonize. Now in the world of sense too it is plainly impossible for movement to be initiated if there is nothing at rest, and before all else in our present subject—animal life. For if one of the parts of an animal be moved, another must be at rest, and this is the purpose of their joints; animals use joints like a centre, and the whole member, in which the joint is, becomes both one and two, both straight and bent, changing potentially and actually by reason of the joint. And when it is bending and being moved one of the points in the joint is moved and one is at rest, just as if the points *A* and *D* of a diameter were at rest, and *B* were moved, and *DAC* were generated. However, in the geometrical illustration, the centre is held to be altogether indivisible (for in mathematics motion is a fiction, as the phrase goes, no mathematical entity being really moved), whereas in the case of joints the centres become now one potentially and divided actually, and now one actually and divided potentially. But still the origin of movement, qua origin, always remains at rest when the lower part of a limb is moved; for example, the elbow joint, when the forearm is moved, and the shoulder, when the whole arm; the knee when the tibia

ὅλου δὲ τοῦ σκέλου τὸ ἰσχίον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ ἔκαστόν τι δεῖ ἔχειν ἡρεμοῦν, ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ κινουμένου ἔσται, καὶ πρὸς ὃ ἀπεριδόμενον καὶ ὅλον ἀθρόον κινήσεται καὶ κατὰ μέρος, φανερόν.

Ἀλλὰ πᾶσα ἡ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡρεμία ὁμῶς ἄκυρος, ἂν μὴ τι ἔξωθεν ἢ ἀπλῶς ἡρεμοῦν καὶ ἀκίνητον. ἄξιον δ' ἐπιστήσαντας ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ τοῦ λεχθέντος· ἔχει γὰρ τὴν θεωρίαν οὐ μόνον ὅσον ἐπὶ τὰ ζῶα συντείνουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ παντὸς κίνησιν καὶ φοράν. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ δεῖ τι ἀκίνητον εἶναι, εἰ μέλλει κινεῖσθαι, οὕτως ἔτι μᾶλλον ἔξω δεῖ τι εἶναι τοῦ ζώου ἀκίνητον, πρὸς ὃ ἀπεριδόμενον κινεῖται τὸ κινούμενον. εἰ γὰρ ὑποδώσει ἀεὶ, οἷον τοῖς ἐμύσει τοῖς ἐν τῇ γῇ, ἢ τοῖς ἐν τῇ ἁμμῳ πορευομένοις, οὐ πρόεισιν, οὐδ' ἔσται οὔτε πορεία, εἰ μὴ ἡ γῆ μένοι, οὔτε πτήσις ἢ νεύσις, εἰ μὴ ὁ ἀήρ ἢ ἡ θάλαττα ἀντερείδοι. ἀνάγκη δὲ τοῦτο ἕτερον εἶναι τοῦ κινουμένου, καὶ ὅλον ὅλου, καὶ μόριον μηδὲν εἶναι τοῦ κινουμένου τὸ οὕτως ἀκίνητον· εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐ κινήσεται. μαρτύριον δὲ τούτου τὸ ἀπορούμενον, διὰ τί ποτε τὸ πλοῖον ἔξωθεν μὲν, ἂν τις ὠθῇ τῷ κοντῷ τὸν ἰσθὺν ἢ τι ἄλλο προσβάλλων μόριον, κινεῖ ῥαδίως, ἔαν δ' ἐν αὐτῷ τις ὦν τῷ πλοίῳ τοῦτο πειράται πράττειν, οὐκ ἂν κινήσειεν οὐδ' ἂν ὁ Τιτυὸς οὐθ' ὁ Βορέας πνέων ἔσωθεν ἐκ τοῦ πλοίου, εἰ τύχοι πνέων τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ὅνπερ οἱ γραφεῖς ποιοῦσιν· ἐξ αὐτοῦ γὰρ τὸ πνεῦμα ἀφιέντα γράφουσιν. ἔαν τε γὰρ ἡρέμα ῥιπτῇ τὸ πνεῦμά τις ἔαν τ' ἰσχυρῶς οὕτως ὥστ' ἄνεμον ποιεῖν τὸν μέγιστον, ἔαν τε ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ ῥιπτούμενον ἢ ὠθούμενον, ἀνάγκη πρῶτον μὲν πρὸς ἡρεμοῦν τι τῶν αὐτοῦ μορίων ἀπεριδόμενον ὠθεῖν, εἴτα πάλιν τοῦτο τὸ μόριον, ἢ αὐτὸ ἢ οὐ τυγχάνει μόριον ὄν, πρὸς τῶν ἔξωθεν τι ἀποστηριζόμενον μένειν. ὁ δὲ τὸ πλοῖον ὠθῶν ἐν τῷ πλοίῳ αὐτὸς ὦν καὶ ἀποστηριζόμενος πρὸς τὸ πλοῖον ἐνλόγως οὐ κινεῖ τὸ πλοῖον διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς ὃ ἀποστηρίζεται μένειν· συμβαίνει δ' αὐτῷ τὸ αὐτὸ ὃ τε κινεῖ καὶ πρὸς ὃ ἀποστηρίζεται. ἔξωθεν δ' ὠθῶν ἢ ἔλκων κινεῖ· οὐθὲν γὰρ μέρος ἢ γῆ τοῦ πλοίου.

is moved, and the hip when the whole leg. Accordingly it is plain that each animal as a whole must have within itself a point at rest, whence will be the origin of that which is moved, and supporting itself upon which it will be moved both as a complete whole and in its members.

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But the point of rest in the animal is still quite ineffectual unless there be something without which is absolutely at rest and immovable. Now it is worth while to pause and consider what has been said, for it involves a speculation which extends beyond animals even to the motion and march of the universe. For just as there must be something immovable within the animal, if it is to be moved, so even more must there be without it something immovable, by supporting itself upon which that which is moved moves. For were that something always to give way (as it does for mice walking in grain or persons walking in sand) advance would be impossible, and neither would there be any walking unless the ground were to remain still, nor any flying or swimming were not the air and the sea to resist. And this which resists must needs be different from what is moved, the whole of it from the whole of that, and what is thus immovable must be no part of what is moved; otherwise there will be no movement. Evidence of this lies in the problem why it is that a man easily moves a boat from outside, if he push with a pole, putting it against the mast or some other part, but if he tried to do this when in the boat itself he would never move it, no not giant Tityus himself nor Boreas blowing from inside the ship, if he really were blowing in the way painters represent him; for they paint him sending the breath out from the boat. For whether one blew gently or so stoutly as to make a very great wind, and whether what were thrown or pushed were wind or something else, it is necessary in the first place to be supported upon one of one's own members which is at rest and so to push, and in the second place for this member, either itself, or that of which it is a part, to remain at rest, fixing itself against something external to itself. Now the man who is himself in the boat, if he pushes, fixing himself against the boat, very naturally does not move the boat, because what he pushes against should properly remain at rest. Now what he is trying to move, and what he is fixing himself against is in his case the same. If, however, he pushes or pulls from outside he does move it, for the ground is no part of the boat.

Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις, ἄρ' εἴ τι κινεῖ τὸν ὅλον οὐρανόν, εἶναι θέλει ἀκίνητον, καὶ τοῦτο μηθὲν εἶναι τοῦ οὐρανοῦ μόριον μηδ' ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ. εἴτε γὰρ αὐτὸ κινούμενον κινεῖ αὐτόν, ἀνάγκη τινὸς ἀκινήτου θιγγάνον κινεῖν, καὶ τοῦτο μηδὲν εἶναι μόριον τοῦ κινούντος· εἴτ' εὐθὺς ἀκινήτόν ἐστι τὸ κινούν, ὁμοίως οὐδὲν ἔσται τοῦ κινουμένου μόριον. καὶ τοῦτό γ' ὁρθῶς λέγουσιν οἱ λέγοντες, ὅτι κύκλῳ φερομένης τῆς σφαίρας οὐδ' ὅτιοι μένει μόριον· ἢ γὰρ ἂν ὅλην ἀναγκαῖον ἦν μένειν, ἢ διασπασθαι τὸ συνεχὲς αὐτῆς. ἀλλ' ὅτι τοὺς πόλους οἴονται τινα δύναμιν ἔχειν, οὐθὲν ἔχοντας μέγεθος ἀλλ' ὄντας ἔσχατα καὶ στιγμάς, οὐ καλῶς. πρὸς γὰρ τῷ μηδεμίαν οὐσίαν εἶναι τῶν τοιούτων μηδενός, καὶ κινεῖσθαι τὴν μίαν κίνησιν ὑπὸ δυοῖν ἀδύνατον· τοὺς δὲ πόλους δύο ποιοῦσιν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔχει τι καὶ πρὸς τὴν ὅλην φύσιν οὕτως ὥσπερ ἡ γῆ πρὸς τὰ ζῶα καὶ τὰ κινούμενα δι' αὐτῶν, ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων ἂν τις διαπορήσειεν.

οἱ δὲ μυθικῶς τὸν Ἄτλαντα ποιοῦντες ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἔχοντα τοὺς πόδας δόξαιεν ἂν ἀπὸ διανοίας εἰρηκέναι τὸν μῦθον, ὡς τοῦτον ὥσπερ διάμετρον ὄντα καὶ στρέφοντα τὸν οὐρανὸν περὶ τοὺς πόλους· τοῦτο δ' ἂν συμβαίνει καὶ κατὰ λόγον διὰ τὸ τὴν γῆν μένειν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ταῦτα λέγουσιν ἀναγκαῖον φάναι μηδὲν εἶναι μόριον αὐτῆς τοῦ παντός, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις δεῖ τὴν ἰσχὺν ἰσάζειν τοῦ κινούντος καὶ τὴν τοῦ μένοντος. ἔστι γάρ τι πλήθος ἰσχύος καὶ δυνάμεως καθ' ἣν μένει τὸ μένον, ὥσπερ καὶ καθ' ἣν κινεῖ τὸ κινούν· καὶ ἔστι τις ἀναλογία ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ὥσπερ τῶν ἐναντίων κινήσεων, οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἡρεμιῶν. καὶ αἱ μὲν ἵσαι ἀπαθεῖς ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, κρατοῦνται δὲ κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν. διόπερ εἴτ' Ἄτλας εἴτε τι τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ἕτερον τὸ κινούν τῶν ἐντός, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἀντερείδειν δεῖ τῆς μονῆς ἢ τὴν γῆν τυγχάνει μένουσα· ἢ κινήσεται ἢ γῆ ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου καὶ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτῆς τόπου. ὥς γὰρ τὸ ὠθοῦν ὠθεῖ, οὕτω τὸ ὠθούμενον ὠθεῖται, καὶ ὁμοίως κατ' ἰσχύν. κινεῖ δὲ τὸ ἡρεμοῦν πρῶτον, ὥστε μᾶλλον καὶ πλείων ἡ ἰσχὺς ἢ ὁμοία καὶ ἴση τῆς ἡρεμίας. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἡ τοῦ κινουμένου μέν, μὴ κινούντος δέ. τοσαύτην οὖν δεήσει τὴν δύναμιν εἶναι τῆς γῆς ἐν τῷ ἡρεμῇ ὅσην ὅτε πᾶς οὐρανὸς ἔχει καὶ τὸ κινούν αὐτόν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον, ἀδύνατον καὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι τὸν οὐρανὸν ὑπὸ τινος τοιούτου τῶν ἐντός.

Here we may ask the difficult question whether if something moves the whole heavens this mover must be immovable, and moreover be no part of the heavens, nor in the heavens. For either it is moved itself and moves the heavens, in which case it must touch something immovable in order to create movement, and then this is no part of that which creates movement; or if the mover is from the first immovable it will equally be no part of that which is moved. In this point at least they argue correctly who say that as the Sphere is carried round in a circle no single part remains still, for then either the whole would necessarily stand still or its continuity be torn asunder; but they argue less well in supposing that the poles have a certain force, though conceived as having no magnitude, but as merely termini or points. For besides the fact that no such things have any substantial existence it is impossible for a single movement to be initiated by what is twofold; and yet they make the poles two. From a review of these difficulties we may conclude that there is something so related to the whole of Nature, as the earth is to animals and things moved by them.

And the mythologists with their fable of Atlas setting his feet upon the earth appear to have based the fable upon intelligent grounds. They make Atlas a kind of diameter twirling the heavens about the poles. Now as the earth remains still this would be reasonable enough, but their theory involves them in the position that the earth is no part of the universe. And further the force of that which initiates movement must be made equal to the force of that which remains at rest. For there is a definite quantity of force or power by dint of which that which remains at rest does so, just as there is of force by dint of which that which initiates movement does so; and as there is a necessary proportion between opposite motions, so there is between absences of motion. Now equal forces are unaffected by one another, but are overcome by a superiority of force. And so in their theory Atlas, or whatever similar power initiates movement from within, must exert no more force than will exactly balance the stability of the earth—otherwise the earth will be moved out of her place in the centre of things. For as the pusher pushes so is the pushed pushed, and with equal force. But the prime mover moves that which is to begin with at rest, so that the power it exerts is greater, rather than equal and like to the power which produces absence of motion in that which is moved. And similarly also the power of what is moved and so moves must be greater than the power of that which is moved but does not initiate movement. Therefore the force of the earth in its

immobility will have to be as great as the force of the whole heavens, and of that which moves the heavens. But if that is impossible, it follows that the heavens cannot possibly be moved by any force of this kind inside them.

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Ἔστι δέ τις ἀπορία περὶ τὰς κινήσεις τῶν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ μορίων, ἣν ὡς οὖσαν οἰκείαν τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἐπισκέψαιτ' ἂν τις. ἐὰν γάρ τις ὑπερβάλλῃ τῇ δυνάμει τῆς κινήσεως τὴν τῆς γῆς ἡρεμίαν, δῆλον ὅτι κινήσει αὐτὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου. καὶ ἡ ἰσχύς δ' ἀφ' ἧς αὕτη ἡ δύναμις, ὅτι οὐκ ἄπειρος, φανερόν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ γῆ ἄπειρος, ὥστ' οὐδὲ τὸ βάρος αὐτῆς. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἀδύνατον λέγεται πλεοναχῶς οὐ γὰρ ὡσαύτως τὴν τε φωνὴν ἀδύνατόν φαμεν εἶναι ὀραθῆναι καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς σελήνης ὕψ' ἡμῶν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, τὸ δὲ πεφυκὸς ὀραῖσθαι οὐκ ὀφθῆσεται, τὸν δ' οὐρανὸν ἀφθαρτον εἶναι καὶ ἀδιάλυτον οἰόμεθα μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι, συμβαίνει δὲ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης· πέφυκε γὰρ καὶ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι κίνησιν μεῖζω καὶ ἀφ' ἧς ἡρεμεῖ ἡ γῆ καὶ ἀφ' ἧς κινεῖται τὸ πῦρ καὶ τὸ ἄνω σῶμα· εἰ μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν ὑπερέχουσαι κινήσεις, διαλυθήσεται ταῦτα ὑπ' ἀλλήλων· εἰ δὲ μὴ εἰσὶ μὲν, ἐνδέχεται δ' εἶναι ἄπειρον γὰρ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται διὰ τὸ μηδὲ σῶμα ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄπειρον εἶναι, ἐνδέχονται δ' ἂν διαλυθῆναι τὸν οὐρανόν. τί γὰρ κωλύει τοῦτο συμβῆναι, εἴπερ μὴ ἀδύνατον; οὐκ ἀδύνατον δέ, εἰ μὴ τὰντικείμενον ἀναγκαῖον. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῆς ἀπορίας ταύτης ἕτερος ἔστω λόγος·

Ἄρα δὲ δεῖ τι ἀκίνητον εἶναι καὶ ἡρεμοῦν ἔξω τοῦ κινουμένου, μηδὲν δὲν ἐκείνου μόριον, ἢ οὐ; καὶ τοῦτο πότερον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ παντὸς οὕτως ὑπάρχειν ἀναγκαῖον; ἴσως γὰρ ἂν δόξειεν ἄτοπον εἶναι, εἰ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως ἐντός. διὸ δόξειεν ἂν τοῖς οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εὖ εἰρησθαι Ὀμήρῳ ἄλλ' οὐκ ἂν ἐρύσαιτ' ἐξ οὐρανόθεν πεδίονδε Ζῆν' ὑπατον πάντων, οὐδ' εἰ μάλα πολλὰ κάμοιτε· πάντες δ' ἐξάπτεσθε θεοὶ πᾶσαι τε θείαι. τὸ γὰρ ὅλως ἀκίνητον ὑπ' οὐδενὸς ἐνδέχεται κινήθηναι. ὅθεν λύεται καὶ ἡ πάλαι λεχθεῖσα ἀπορία, πότερον ἐνδέχεται ἢ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται διαλυθῆναι τὴν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ σύστασιν, εἰ ἐξ ἀκινήτου ἤρτηται ἀρχῆς.

ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ζώων οὐ μόνον τὸ οὕτως ἀκίνητον δεῖ ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς κινουμένοις κατὰ τόπον ὅσα κινεῖ αὐτὰ αὐτά.

There is a further difficulty about the motions of the parts of the heavens which, as akin to what has gone before, may be considered next. For if one could overcome by force of motion the immobility of the earth he would clearly move it away from the centre. And it is plain that the power from which this force would originate will not be infinite, for the earth is not infinite and therefore its weight is not. Now there are more senses than one of the word 'impossible'. When we say it is impossible to see a sound, and when we say it is impossible to see the men in the moon, we use two senses of the word; the former is of necessity, the latter, though their nature is to be seen, cannot as a fact be seen by us. Now we suppose that the heavens are of necessity impossible to destroy and to dissolve, whereas the result of the present argument would be to do away with this necessity. For it is natural and possible for a motion to exist greater than the force by dint of which the earth is at rest, or than that by dint of which Fire and Aether are moved. If then there are superior motions, these will be dissolved in succession by one another: and if there actually are not, but might possibly be (for the earth cannot be infinite because no body can possibly be infinite), there is a possibility of the heavens being dissolved. For what is to prevent this coming to pass, unless it be impossible? And it is not impossible unless the opposite is necessary. This difficulty, however, we will discuss elsewhere.

To resume, must there be something immovable and at rest outside of what is moved, and no part of it, or not? And must this necessarily be so also in the case of the universe? Perhaps it would be thought strange were the origin of movement inside. And to those who so conceive it the word of Homer would appear to have been well spoken: 'Nay, ye would not pull Zeus, highest of all from heaven to the plain, no not even if ye toiled right hard; come, all ye gods and goddesses! Set hands to the chain'; for that which is entirely immovable cannot possibly be moved by anything. And herein lies the solution of the difficulty stated some time back, the possibility or impossibility of dissolving the system of the heavens, in that it depends from an original which is immovable.

Now in the animal world there must be not only an immovable without, but also within those things

δεί γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὸ μὲν ἡρεμεῖν τὸ δὲ κινεῖσθαι, πρὸς ὃ ἀπεριεδόμενον τὸ κινούμενον κινήσεται, οἷον ἂν τι κινή τῶν μορίων ἀπερίδεται γὰρ θάτερον ὡς πρὸς μένον θάτερον.

περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀψύχων ὅσα κινεῖται ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις, πότερον ἅπαντ' ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτοῖς καὶ τὸ ἡρεμοῦν καὶ τὸ κινεῖν, καὶ πρὸς τῶν ἔξω τι ἡρεμοῦντων ἀπερίδεται ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῦτα, ἢ ἀδύνατον, οἷον πῦρ ἢ γῆν ἢ τῶν ἀψύχων τι, ἀλλ' ὅφ' ὧν ταῦτα κινεῖται πρῶτων. πάντα γὰρ ὑπ' ἄλλου κινεῖται τὰ ἀψύχα, ἀρχὴ δὲ πάντων τῶν οὕτως κινουμένων τὰ αὐτὰ αὐτὰ κινεῖν. τῶν δὲ τοιούτων περὶ μὲν τῶν ζώων εἴρηται· τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα πάντα ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχειν τὸ ἡρεμοῦν, καὶ ἔξω πρὸς ὃ ἀπερίσεται. εἰ δέ τι ἐστὶν ἀνωτέρω καὶ πρῶτως κινεῖν, ἀδελον, καὶ ἄλλος λόγος περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς. τὰ δὲ ζῶα ὅσα κινεῖται, πάντα πρὸς τὰ ἔξω ἀπεριεδόμενα κινεῖται, καὶ ἀναπνέοντα καὶ ἐκπνέοντα. οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει μέγα ῥῖψαι βάρος ἢ μικρόν, ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ πτύοντες καὶ βήτηντες καὶ οἱ εἰσπνέοντες καὶ ἐκπνέοντες.

which move in place, and initiate their own movement. For one part of an animal must be moved, and another be at rest, and against this the part which is moved will support itself and be moved; for example, if it move one of its parts; for one part, as it were, supports itself against another part at rest.

But about things without life which are moved one might ask the question whether all contain in themselves both that which is at rest and that which initiates movement, and whether they also, for instance fire, earth, or any other inanimate thing, must support themselves against something outside which is at rest. Or is this impossible and must it not be looked for rather in those primary causes by which they are set in motion? For all things without life are moved by something other, and the origin of all things so moved are things which move themselves. And out of these we have spoken about animals (for they must all have in themselves that which is at rest, and without them that against which they are supported); but whether there is some higher and prime mover is not clear, and an origin of that kind involves a different discussion. Animals at any rate which move themselves are all moved supporting themselves on what is outside them, even when they inspire and expire; for there is no essential difference between casting a great and a small weight, and this is what men do when they spit and cough and when they breathe in and breathe out.

5

Πότερον δ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ αὐτὸ κινεῖται κατὰ τόπον μόνῳ δεῖ τι μένειν, ἢ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀλλοιούμενῳ αὐτῷ ὅφ' αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐξανομένου, περὶ δὲ γενέσεως τῆς ἐξ ἀρχῆς καὶ φθορᾶς ἄλλος λόγος· εἰ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἥνπερ φάμεν πρῶτην κίνησιν γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς, αὕτη αἰτία ἂν εἴη, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὲ κινήσεων ἴσως πασῶν. ὥσπερ δ' ἐν τῷ ὄλῳ, καὶ ἐν τῷ ζώῳ κινήσεις πρῶτη αὕτη, ὅταν τελεωθῇ ὥστε καὶ αὐξήσεως, εἴ ποτε γίνεται, αὐτὸ αὐτῷ αἴτιον καὶ ἀλλοιώσεως, εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἀνάγκη. αἱ δὲ πρῶται αὐξήσεις καὶ ἀλλοιώσεις ὑπ' ἄλλου γίνονται καὶ δι' ἐτέρων· γενέσεως δὲ καὶ φθορᾶς οὐδαμῶς οἷον τε αὐτὸ αἴτιον εἶναι αὐτῷ οὐδέν. προὔπαρχειν γὰρ δεῖ τὸ κινεῖν τοῦ κινουμένου καὶ τὸ γεννῶν τοῦ γεννωμένου αὐτὸ δ' αὐτοῦ πρότερον οὐδέν ἐστιν.

But is it only in that which moves itself in place that there must be a point at rest, or does this hold also of that which causes its own qualitative changes, and its own growth? Now the question of original generation and decay is different; for if there is, as we hold, a primary movement, this would be the cause of generation and decay, and probably of all the secondary movements too. And as in the universe, so in the animal world this is the primary movement, when the creature attains maturity; and therefore it is the cause of growth, when the creature becomes the cause of its own growth, and the cause too of alteration. But if this is not the primary movement then the point at rest is not necessary. However, the earliest growth and alteration in the living creature arise through another and by other channels, nor can anything possibly be the cause of its own generation and decay, for the mover must exist before the moved, the begetter before the begotten, and nothing is prior to itself.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν ψυχῆς, εἴτε κινεῖται εἴτε μή, καὶ εἰ κινεῖται, πῶς κινεῖται, πρότερον εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς διωρισμένοις περὶ αὐτῆς. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ ἄψυχα πάντα κινεῖται ὑφ' ἑτέρου, περὶ δὲ τοῦ πρώτου κινουμένου καὶ αἰεὶ κινουμένου, τίνα τρόπον κινεῖται, καὶ πῶς κινεῖ τὸ πρῶτον κινούν, διώριται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς πρώτης φιλοσοφίας, λοιπὸν ἐστὶ θεωρῆσαι πῶς ἡ ψυχὴ κινεῖ τὸ σῶμα, καὶ τίς ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς τοῦ ζώου κινήσεως. τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων παρὰ τὴν τοῦ ὅλου κίνησιν τὰ ἔμψυχα αἰτία τῆς κινήσεως, ὅσα μὴ κινεῖται ὑπ' ἀλλήλων διὰ τὸ προσκόπτειν ἀλλήλους. διὸ καὶ πέρας ἔχουσιν αὐτῶν πᾶσαι αἱ κινήσεις· καὶ γὰρ καὶ αἱ τῶν ἔμψυχων. πάντα γὰρ τὰ ζῶα καὶ κινεῖ καὶ κινεῖται ἕνεκά τινος, ὥστε τοῦτ' ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς πάσης τῆς κινήσεως πέρας, τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα. ὁρῶμεν δὲ τὰ κινούντα τὸ ζῶον διάνοιαν καὶ φαντασίαν καὶ προαίρεσιν καὶ βούλησιν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ἀνάγεται εἰς νοῦν καὶ ὄρεξιν. καὶ γὰρ ἡ φαντασία καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις τὴν αὐτὴν τῶν ὡς χώραν ἔχουσιν· κριτικὰ γὰρ πάντα, διαφέρουσι δὲ κατὰ τὰς εἰρημένας ἐν ἄλλοις διαφοράς. βούλησις δὲ καὶ θυμὸς καὶ ἐπιθυμία πάντα ὄρεξις, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις κοινὸν διανοίας καὶ ὀρέξεως· ὥστε κινεῖ πρῶτον τὸ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ διανοητόν. οὐ πᾶν δὲ τὸ διανοητόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῶν πρακτῶν τέλος. διὸ τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὸ κινούν, ἀλλ' οὐ πᾶν τὸ καλόν· ἢ γὰρ ἕνεκα τούτου ἄλλο, καὶ ἢ τέλος ἐστὶ τῶν ἄλλου τινὸς ἕνεκα ὄντων, αὐτὴ κινεῖ. δεῖ δὲ τιθέναι καὶ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθοῦ χώραν ἔχειν, καὶ τὸ ἡδύ· φαινόμενον γάρ ἐστιν ἀγαθόν. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἐστὶ μὲν ἡ ὁμοίως κινεῖται τὸ αἰεὶ κινούμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ αἰεὶ κινούντος καὶ τῶν ζώων ἕκαστον, ἐστὶ δ' ἢ ἄλλως, διὸ καὶ τὰ μὲν αἰεὶ κινεῖται, ἡ δὲ τῶν ζώων κίνησις ἔχει πέρας. τὸ δὲ αἰδίον καλόν, καὶ τὸ ἀληθῶς καὶ τὸ πρώτως ἀγαθόν καὶ μὴ ποτὲ μὲν ποτὲ δὲ μή, θειότερον καὶ τιμιώτερον ἢ ὥστ' εἶναι πρότερόν τι. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον οὐ κινούμενον κινεῖ, ἡ δ' ὄρεξις καὶ τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν κινούμενον κινεῖ. τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον τῶν κινουμένων οὐκ ἀνάγκη κινεῖν οὐδέν. φανερόν δ' ἐκ τούτων καὶ ὅτι εὐλόγως ἢ φορὰ τελευταία τῶν γινομένων ἐν τοῖς κινουμένοις· κινεῖται γὰρ καὶ πορεύεται τὸ ζῶον ὀρέξει ἢ προαιρέσει, ἀλλοιωθέντος τινὸς κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἢ τὴν φαντασίαν.

Now whether the soul is moved or not, and how it is moved if it be moved, has been stated before in our treatise concerning it. And since all inorganic things are moved by some other thing—and the manner of the movement of the first and eternally moved, and how the first mover moves it, has been determined before in our Metaphysics, it remains to inquire how the soul moves the body, and what is the origin of movement in a living creature. For, if we except the movement of the universe, things with life are the causes of the movement of all else, that is of all that are not moved by one another by mutual impact. And so all their motions have a term or limit, inasmuch as the movements of things with life have such. For all living things both move and are moved with some object, so that this is the term of all their movement, the end, that is, in view. Now we see that the living creature is moved by intellect, imagination, purpose, wish, and appetite. And all these are reducible to mind and desire. For both imagination and sensation are on common ground with mind, since all three are faculties of judgement though differing according to distinctions stated elsewhere. Will, however, impulse, and appetite, are all three forms of desire, while purpose belongs both to intellect and to desire. Therefore the object of desire or of intellect first initiates movement, not, that is, every object of intellect, only the end in the domain of conduct. Accordingly among goods that which moves is a practical end, not the good in its whole extent. For it initiates movement only so far as something else is for its sake, or so far as it is the object of that which is for the sake of something else. And we must suppose that a seeming good may take the room of actual good, and so may the pleasant, which is itself a seeming good. From these considerations it is clear that in one regard that which is eternally moved by the eternal mover is moved in the same way as every living creature, in another regard differently, and so while it is moved eternally, the movement of living creatures has a term. Now the eternal beautiful, and the truly and primarily good (which is not at one time good, at another time not good), is too divine and precious to be relative to anything else. The prime mover then moves, itself being unmoved, whereas desire and its faculty are moved and so move. But it is not necessary for the last in the chain of things moved to move something else; wherefore it is plainly reasonable that motion in place should be the last of what happens in the region of things happening, since the living creature is moved and goes forward by reason of desire or purpose, when some alteration has been set going on the occasion of sensation or imagination.

Πῶς δὲ νοῶν ὅτε μὲν πράττει ὅτε δ' οὐ
 πράττει, καὶ κινεῖται, ὅτε δ' οὐ κινεῖται; ἔοικε
 παραπλησίως συμβαίνειν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀκι-
 νήτων διανοουμένων καὶ συλλογιζομένων. ἀλλ'
 ἐκεῖ μὲν θεώρημα τὸ τέλος ὅταν γὰρ τὰς δύο
 προτάσεις νοήσῃ, τὸ συμπέρασμα ἐνόησε καὶ
 συνέθηκεν, ἐνταῦθα δ' ἐκ τῶν δύο προτάσεων
 τὸ συμπέρασμα γίνεται ἢ πρᾶξις, οἷον ὅταν
 νοήσῃ ὅτι παντὶ βαδιστέον ἀνθρώπῳ, αὐτὸς
 δ' ἄνθρωπος, βαδίζει εὐθέως, ἂν δ' ὅτι οὐ-
 δενὶ βαδιστέον νῦν ἀνθρώπῳ, αὐτὸς δ' ἄνθρω-
 πος, εὐθὺς ἡρεμεῖ καὶ ταῦτα ἄμφω πράττει,
 ἂν μὴ τι κωλύῃ ἢ ἀναγκάζῃ. ποιητέον μοι ἀγα-
 θόν, οἰκία δ' ἀγαθὸν ποιεῖ οἰκίαν εὐθύς. σκε-
 πάσματος δέομαι, ἱμάτιον δὲ σκέπασμα· ἱμα-
 τίου δέομαι. οὐ δέομαι, ποιητέον ἱματίου δέ-
 ομαι ἱμάτιον ποιητέον. καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα,
 τὸ ἱμάτιον ποιητέον, πρᾶξις ἐστίν. πράττει
 δ' ἀπ' ἀρχῆς. εἰ ἱμάτιον ἔσται, ἀνάγκη εἶ-
 ναι τότε πρῶτον, εἰ δὲ τότε, τότε καὶ τοῦτο
 πράττει εὐθύς. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἢ πρᾶξις τὸ συμ-
 πέρασμα, φανερόν· αἱ δὲ προτάσεις αἱ ποιητι-
 καὶ διὰ δύο εἰδῶν γίνονται, διὰ τε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ
 καὶ διὰ τοῦ δυνατοῦ.

ὥσπερ δὲ τῶν ἐρωτῶντων ἔνιοι, οὕτω τὴν
 ἑτέραν πρότασιν τὴν δῆλην οὐδ' ἢ διάνοια ἐφι-
 στασα σκοπεῖ οὐδέν· οἷον εἰ τὸ βαδίζειν ἀγα-
 θὸν ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος, οὐκ ἐνδια-
 τρίζει. διὸ καὶ ὅσα μὴ λογισάμενοι πράττο-
 μεν, ταχὺ πράττομεν. ὅταν ἐνεργήσῃ γὰρ ἢ
 τῇ αἰσθήσει πρὸς τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα ἢ τῇ φαντασίᾳ
 ἢ τῷ νῷ, οὐ ὁρέγεται, εὐθὺς ποιεῖ· ἂν τ' ἐρω-
 τήσεως γὰρ ἢ νοήσεως ἢ τῆς ὁρέξεως γίνε-
 ται ἐνέργεια. ποτέον μοι, ἢ ἐπιθυμία λέγει·
 τοδὶ δὲ ποτόν, ἢ αἰσθησις εἶπεν ἢ ἡ φαντασία
 ἢ ὁ νοῦς· εὐθὺς πίνει. οὕτως μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ κι-
 νεῖσθαι καὶ πράττειν τὰ ζῶα ὁρμῶσι, τῆς μὲν
 ἐσχάτης αἰτίας τοῦ κινεῖσθαι ὁρέξεως οὔσης,
 ταύτης δὲ γινομένης ἢ δι' αἰσθήσεως ἢ διὰ
 φαντασίας καὶ νοήσεως. τῶν δ' ὁρεγομένων
 πράττειν τὰ μὲν δι' ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ θυμὸν τὰ δὲ
 δι' ὄρεξιν ἢ βούλησιν τὰ μὲν ποιούσι, τὰ δὲ
 πράττουσιν.

ὥσπερ δὲ τὰ αὐτόματα κινεῖται μικρὰς κι-
 νήσεως γινομένης, λυομένων τῶν στρεβλῶν
 καὶ κρουόντων ἀλλήλας τὰς στρέβλας, καὶ τὸ
 ἀμάξιον, ὅπερ ὁχοῦμενον αὐτὸ κινεῖ εἰς εὐθύ,
 καὶ πάλιν κύκλῳ κινεῖται τῷ ἀνίσού ἔχειν τοὺς
 τροχοὺς ὁ γὰρ ἐλάττων ὥσπερ κέντρον γίνε-
 ται, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς κυλίνδροις, οὕτω καὶ τὰ
 ζῶα κινεῖται. ἔχει γὰρ ὄργανα τοιαῦτα τὴν τε
 τῶν νεύρων φύσιν καὶ τὴν τῶν ὀστέων, τὰ μὲν

But how is it that thought (viz. sense, imagina-
 tion, and thought proper) is sometimes followed by ac-
 tion, sometimes not; sometimes by movement, some-
 times not? What happens seems parallel to the case of
 thinking and inferring about the immovable objects of
 science. There the end is the truth seen (for, when
 one conceives the two premisses, one at once con-
 ceives and comprehends the conclusion), but here the
 two premisses result in a conclusion which is an ac-
 tion—for example, one conceives that every man ought
 to walk, one is a man oneself: straightway one walks;
 or that, in this case, no man should walk, one is a man:
 straightway one remains at rest. And one so acts in the
 two cases provided that there is nothing in the one case
 to compel or in the other to prevent. Again, I ought to
 create a good, a house is good: straightway I make a
 house. I need a covering, a coat is a covering: I need
 a coat. What I need I ought to make, I need a coat: I
 make a coat. And the conclusion I must make a coat
 is an action. And the action goes back to the begin-
 ning or first step. If there is to be a coat, one must first
 have B, and if B then A, so one gets A to begin with.
 Now that the action is the conclusion is clear. But the
 premisses of action are of two kinds, of the good and
 of the possible.

And as in some cases of speculative inquiry we
 suppress one premise so here the mind does not stop
 to consider at all an obvious minor premise; for ex-
 ample if walking is good for man, one does not dwell
 upon the minor 'I am a man'. And so what we do
 without reflection, we do quickly. For when a man
 actualizes himself in relation to his object either by
 perceiving, or imagining or conceiving it, what he de-
 sires he does at once. For the actualizing of desire is
 a substitute for inquiry or reflection. I want to drink,
 says appetite; this is drink, says sense or imagination
 or mind: straightway I drink. In this way living crea-
 tures are impelled to move and to act, and desire is
 the last or immediate cause of movement, and desire
 arises after perception or after imagination and con-
 ception. And things that desire to act now create and
 now act under the influence of appetite or impulse or
 of desire or wish.

The movements of animals may be compared with
 those of automatic puppets, which are set going on the
 occasion of a tiny movement; the levers are released,
 and strike the twisted strings against one another; or
 with the toy wagon. For the child mounts on it and
 moves it straight forward, and then again it is moved
 in a circle owing to its wheels being of unequal diame-
 ter (the smaller acts like a centre on the same principle
 as the cylinders). Animals have parts of a similar kind,

ὥς ἐκεῖ τὰ ξύλα καὶ ὁ σίδηρος, τὰ δὲ νεῦρα ὥς αἱ στρέβλαι· ὧν λυομένων καὶ ἀνιεμένων κινούνται. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς αὐτομάτοις καὶ τοῖς ἀμαξίοις οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλοιώσεις, ἐπεὶ εἰ ἐγίνοντο ἐλάττω οἱ ἐντὸς τροχοὶ καὶ πάλιν μείζου, κἂν κύκλῳ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐκινεῖτο· ἐν δὲ τῷ ζῳῷ δύναται τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ μείζον καὶ ἐλάττω γίνεσθαι καὶ τὰ σχήματα μεταβάλλειν, αὐξανομένων τῶν μορίων διὰ θερμότητα καὶ πάλιν συστελλομένων διὰ ψύξιν καὶ ἀλλοιουμένων. ἀλλοιοῦσι δ' αἱ φαντασίαι καὶ αἱ αἰσθήσεις καὶ αἱ ἔννοιαι. αἱ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθήσεις εὐθὺς ὑπάρχουσιν ἀλλοιώσεις τινὲς οὐσαι, ἡ δὲ φαντασία καὶ ἡ νόησις τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων ἔχουσι δύναμιν· τρόπον γὰρ τινα τὸ εἶδος τὸ νοούμενον τὸ τοῦ θερμοῦ ἢ ψυχροῦ ἢ ἡδέος ἢ φοβεροῦ τοιοῦτον τυγχάνει ὃν οἶόν περ καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἔκαστον, διὸ καὶ φρίττουσι καὶ φοβοῦνται νοήσαντες μόνον. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα πάθη καὶ ἀλλοιώσεις εἰσὶν. ἀλλοιουμένων δ' ἐν τῷ σώματι τὰ μὲν μείζω τὰ δ' ἐλάττω γίνεται. ὅτι δὲ μικρὰ μεταβολὴ γινομένη ἐν ἀρχῇ μεγάλας καὶ πολλὰς ποιεῖ διαφορὰς ἀποθεν, οὐκ ἄδηλον· οἶον τοῦ οἴακος ἀκαριαῖόν τι μεθισταμένου πολλὴ ἢ τῆς πύρας γίνεται μετάστασις. ἔτι δὲ κατὰ θερμότητα ἢ ψύξιν ἢ κατ' ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον πάθος ὅταν γένηται ἀλλοιώσεις περὶ τὴν καρδίαν, καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ κατὰ μέγεθος ἐν ἀναισθητῷ μορίῳ, πολλὴν ποιεῖ τοῦ σώματος διαφορὰν ἐρυθήμασι καὶ ὠχρότησι καὶ φρίκαις καὶ τρόμοις καὶ τοῖς τούτων ἐναντίοις.

their organs, the sinewy tendons to wit and the bones; the bones are like the wooden levers in the automaton, and the iron; the tendons are like the strings, for when these are tightened or leased movement begins. However, in the automata and the toy wagon there is no change of quality, though if the inner wheels became smaller and greater by turns there would be the same circular movement set up. In an animal the same part has the power of becoming now larger and now smaller, and changing its form, as the parts increase by warmth and again contract by cold and change their quality. This change of quality is caused by imaginations and sensations and by ideas. Sensations are obviously a form of change of quality, and imagination and conception have the same effect as the objects so imagined and conceived. For in a measure the form conceived be it of hot or cold or pleasant or fearful is like what the actual objects would be, and so we shudder and are frightened at a mere idea. Now all these affections involve changes of quality, and with those changes some parts of the body enlarge, others grow smaller. And it is not hard to see that a small change occurring at the centre makes great and numerous changes at the circumference, just as by shifting the rudder a hair's breadth you get a wide deviation at the prow. And further, when by reason of heat or cold or some kindred affection a change is set up in the region of the heart, even in an imperceptibly small part of the heart, it produces a vast difference in the periphery of the body,—blushing, let us say, or turning white, goose-skin and shivers and their opposites.

8

Ἀρχὴ μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, τῆς κινήσεως τὸ ἐν τῷ πρακτῷ διωκτὸν καὶ φευκτὸν· ἐξ ἀνάγκης δ' ἀκολουθεῖ τῇ νοήσει καὶ τῇ φαντασίᾳ αὐτῶν θερμότης καὶ ψύξις. τὸ μὲν γὰρ λυπηρὸν φευκτὸν, τὸ δ' ἡδὺ διωκτὸν ἀλλὰ λανθάνει περὶ τὰ μικρὰ τοῦτο συμβαῖνον, ἔστι δὲ τὰ λυπηρὰ καὶ ἡδέα πάντα σχεδὸν μετὰ ψύξεώς τινος καὶ θερμότητος. τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν παθημάτων. θάρρη γὰρ καὶ φόβοι καὶ ἀφροδισιασμοὶ καὶ τᾶλλα σωματικὰ λυπηρὰ καὶ ἡδέα τὰ μὲν κατὰ μόριον μετὰ θερμότητος ἢ ψύξεώς ἐστι, τὰ δὲ καθ' ὅλον τὸ σῶμα· μνήμαι δὲ καὶ ἐλπίδες, οἷον εἰδώλοις χρώμεναι τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὅτε μὲν ἡττον ὅτε δὲ μᾶλλον αἰτίαι τῶν αὐτῶν εἰσιν. ὥστ' εὐλόγως ἡδὴ δημιουργεῖται τὰ ἐντὸς καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τῶν ὀργανικῶν μορίων μεταβάλλοντα ἐκ πεπηγότων ὑγρὰ καὶ ἐξ ὑγρῶν πεπηγότα καὶ μαλακὰ καὶ σκληρὰ ἐξ ἀλλήλων. τούτων

But to return, the object we pursue or avoid in the field of action is, as has been explained, the original of movement, and upon the conception and imagination of this there necessarily follows a change in the temperature of the body. For what is painful we avoid, what is pleasing we pursue. We are, however, unconscious of what happens in the minute parts; still anything painful or pleasing is generally speaking accompanied by a definite change of temperature in the body. One may see this by considering the affections. Blind courage and panic fears, erotic motions, and the rest of the corporeal affections, pleasant and painful, are all accompanied by a change of temperature, some in a particular member, others in the body generally. So, memories and anticipations, using as it were the reflected images of these pleasures and pains, are now more and now less causes of the same changes of temperature. And so we see the reason of nature's handiwork in the inward parts, and in the centres of move-

δὲ συμβαινόντων τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, καὶ ἔτι τοῦ παθητικοῦ καὶ ποιητικοῦ τοιαύτην ἔχόντων τὴν φύσιν οἷαν πολλαχοῦ εἰρήκαμεν, ὁπόταν συμβῇ ὥστ' εἶναι τὸ μὲν ποιητικὸν τὸ δὲ παθητικόν, καὶ μηδὲν ἀπολίπη αὐτῶν ἐκάτερον τῶν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, εὐθὺς τὸ μὲν ποιεῖ τὸ δὲ πάσχει. διὰ τοῦτο δ' ἅμα ὡς εἰπεῖν νοεῖ ὅτι πορευτέον καὶ πορεύεται, ἂν μὴ τι ἐμποδίζῃ ἕτερον. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὀργανικὰ μέρη παρασκευάζει ἐπιτηδεύς τὰ πάθη, ἡ δ' ὄρεξις τὰ πάθη, τὴν δ' ὄρεξιν ἡ φαντασία· αὕτη δὲ γίνεται ἡ διὰ νοήσεως ἡ δι' αἰσθήσεως. ἅμα δὲ καὶ ταχὺ διὰ τὸ τὸ ποιητικὸν καὶ παθητικὸν τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα εἶναι τὴν φύσιν.

τὸ δὲ κινεῖν πρῶτον τὸ ζῶον ἀνάγκη εἶναι ἐν τινι ἀρχῇ· ἡ δὲ καμπὴ ὅτι μὲν ἐστὶ ἀρχὴ τοῦ δὲ τελευτῆ, εἴρηται. διὸ καὶ ἔστι μὲν ὡς ἐνί, ἔστι δ' ὡς δυοὶ χρῆται ἡ φύσις αὐτῇ. ὅταν γὰρ κινῆται ἐντεῦθεν, ἀνάγκη τὸ μὲν ἡρεμεῖν τῶν σημείων τῶν ἐσχάτων, τὸ δὲ κινεῖσθαι· ὅτι γὰρ πρὸς ἡρεμοῦν δεῖ ἀπερείδεσθαι τὸ κινεῖν, εἴρηται πρότερον. κινεῖται μὲν οὖν καὶ οὐ κινεῖ τὸ ἐσχατὸν τοῦ βραχίονος, τῆς δ' ἐν τῷ ὠλεκράνῳ κάμψεως τὸ μὲν κινεῖται τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ὅλῳ κινουμένῳ, ἀνάγκη δ' εἶναι τι καὶ ἀκίνητον, ὃ δὴ φαμεν δυνάμει μὲν εἶναι σημεῖον, ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ γίνεσθαι δύο· ὥστ' εἰ τὸ ζῶον ἦν ὁ βραχίον, ἐνταῦθ' ἂν ποῦ ἦν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ κινουσα. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐνδέχεται καὶ πρὸς τὴν χεῖρα ἔχειν τι οὕτως τῶν ἀψύχων, οἷον εἰ κινεῖται τὴν βακτηρίαν ἐν τῇ χειρὶ, φανερόν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἐν οὐδετέρῳ ἡ ψυχὴ τῶν ἐσχάτων, οὗτ' ἐν τῷ ἐσχατῷ τοῦ κινουμένου οὗτ' ἐν τῇ ἐτέρᾳ ἀρχῇ. καὶ γὰρ τὸ ξύλον ἔχει καὶ ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος πρὸς τὴν χεῖρα. ὥστε διὰ γε τοῦτο, εἰ μὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ βακτηρίᾳ ἡ κινουσα ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρχὴ ἐνεστίν, οὐδ' ἐν τῇ χειρὶ ὁμοίως γὰρ ἔχει καὶ τὸ ἄκρον τῆς χειρὸς πρὸς τὸν καρπόν, καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος πρὸς τὸ ὠλέκρανον. οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει τὰ προσπεφυκότα τῶν μὴ γίνεσθαι γὰρ ὥσπερ ἀφαιρετὸν μέρος ἡ βακτηρία. ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἐν μηδεμίᾳ εἶναι ἀρχῇ, ἢ ἐστὶν ἄλλου τελευτῆ, μηδὲ εἴ τι ἐστὶν ἕτερον ἐκείνου ἐξωτέρῳ, οἷον τοῦ μὲν τῆς βακτηρίας ἐσχατοῦ ἐν τῇ χειρὶ ἡ ἀρχή, τούτου δ' ἐν τῷ καρπῷ. εἰ δὲ μηδ' ἐν τῇ χειρὶ, ὅτι ἀνωτέρῳ ἔτι, ἡ ἀρχὴ οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα· ἔτι γὰρ τοῦ ὠλεκράνου μένοντος κινεῖται ἅπαν τὸ κάτω συνεχές.

ment of the organic members; they change from solid to moist, and from moist to solid, from soft to hard and vice versa. And so when these are affected in this way, and when besides the passive and active have the constitution we have many times described, as often as it comes to pass that one is active and the other passive, and neither of them falls short of the elements of its essence, straightway one acts and the other responds. And on this account thinking that one ought to go and going are virtually simultaneous, unless there be something else to hinder action. The organic parts are suitably prepared by the affections, these again by desire, and desire by imagination. Imagination in its turn depends either upon conception or sense-perception. And the simultaneity and speed are due to the natural correspondence of the active and passive.

However, that which first moves the animal organism must be situate in a definite original. Now we have said that a joint is the beginning of one part of a limb, the end of another. And so nature employs it sometimes as one, sometimes as two. When movement arises from a joint, one of the extreme points must remain at rest, and the other be moved (for as we explained above the mover must support itself against a point at rest); accordingly, in the case of the elbow-joint, the last point of the forearm is moved but does not move anything, while, in the flexion, one point of the elbow, which lies in the whole forearm that is being moved, is moved, but there must also be a point which is unmoved, and this is our meaning when we speak of a point which is in potency one, but which becomes two in actual exercise. Now if the arm were the living animal, somewhere in its elbow-joint would be situate the original seat of the moving soul. Since, however, it is possible for a lifeless thing to be so related to the hand as the forearm is to the upper (for example, when a man moves a stick in his hand), it is evident that the soul, the original of movement, could not lie in either of the two extreme points, neither, that is, in the last point of the stick which is moved, nor in the original point which causes movement. For the stick too has an end point and an originative point by reference to the hand. Accordingly, this example shows that the moving original which derives from the soul is not in the stick and if not, then not in the hand; for a precisely similar relation obtains between the hand and the wrist, as between the wrist and the elbow. In this matter it makes no difference whether the part is a continuous part of the body or not; the stick may be looked at as a detached part of the whole. It follows then of necessity that the original cannot lie in any individual origin which is the end of another member, even though there may lie another part outside the one in question. For example, relatively to the end point

Ἐπεὶ δ' ὁμοίως ἔχει ἀπὸ τῶν ἀριστερῶν καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν δεξιῶν, καὶ ἅμα τὰναντία κινεῖται, ὥστε μὴ εἶναι τῷ ἡρεμεῖν τὸ δεξιὸν κινεῖσθαι τὸ ἀριστερὸν μηδ' αὖ τῷ τοῦτο ἐκείνο, ἀεὶ δ' ἐν τῷ ἀνωτέρῳ ἀμφοτέρων ἡ ἀρχή, ἀνάγκη ἐν τῷ μέσῳ εἶναι τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς κινούσης· ἀμφοτέρων γὰρ τῶν ἄκρων τὸ μέσον ἔσχατον. ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει πρὸς τὰς κινήσεις τοῦτο καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄνω καὶ κάτω, οἷον τὰς ἀπὸ τῆς κεφαλῆς πρὸς τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ῥάχews τοῖς ἔχουσι ῥάχιν.

καὶ εὐλόγως δὲ τοῦτο συμβέβηκεν· καὶ γὰρ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ἐνταῦθα εἶναι φαμεν, ὥστ' ἀλλοιούμενον διὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν τοῦ τόπου τοῦ περὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ μεταβάλλοντος τὰ ἐχόμενα συμμεταβάλλει ἐκτεινόμενά τε καὶ συναγόμενα τὰ μόρια, ὥστ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης διὰ ταῦτα γίνεσθαι τὴν κίνησιν τοῖς ζώοις. τὸ δὲ μέσον τοῦ σώματος μέρος δυνάμει μὲν ἓν, ἐνεργείᾳ δ' ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι πλείω· καὶ γὰρ ἅμα κινεῖται τὰ κῶλα ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς, καὶ θατέρου ἡρεμούντος θάτερον κινεῖται. λέγω δ' οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς *ΑΒΓ* τὸ *Β* κινεῖται, κινεῖ δὲ τὸ *Α*. ἀλλὰ μὴν δεῖ γέ τι ἡρεμεῖν, εἰ μέλλει τὸ μὲν κινεῖσθαι τὸ δὲ κινεῖν. ἐν ᾧ δυνάμει δὲ τὸ *Α* ἐνεργείᾳ δύο ἔσται, ὥστ' ἀνάγκη μὴ στιγμὴν ἀλλὰ μέγεθος τι εἶναι. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐνδέχεται τὸ *Γ* ἅμα τῷ *Β* κινεῖσθαι, ὥστ' ἀνάγκη ἀμφοτέρων τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς ἐν τῷ *Α* κινουμένας κινεῖν. δεῖ τι ἄρα εἶναι παρὰ ταύτας ἕτερον τὸ κινεῖν, καὶ μὴ κινούμενον. ἀπερεῖδοντο μὲν γὰρ ἂν τὰ ἄκρα καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ αἱ ἐν τῷ *Α* πρὸς ἀλλήλας κινουμένων, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τινας τὰ νῶτα ἀντερείδοντες κινεῖν τὰ σκέλη. ἀλλὰ τὸ κινεῖν ἅμφω ἀκίνητον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ, ἕτερον μὲν οὐσα τοῦ μεγέθους τοῦ τοιοῦτου, ἐν τούτῳ δ' οὐσα.

Κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὸν λόγον τὸν λέγοντα τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς κινήσεως ἐστὶν ἡ ὁρεξις τὸ μέσον, ὃ κινεῖ κινούμενον· ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐμφύχοις σώμασι δεῖ τι εἶναι σῶμα τοιοῦτον. τὸ μὲν οὖν κινεῖ-

of the stick the hand is the original, but the original of the hand's movement is in the wrist. And so if the true original is not in the hand, be-there is still something higher up, neither is the true original in the wrist, for once more if the elbow is at rest the whole part below it can be moved as a continuous whole.

9

Now since the left and the right sides are symmetrical, and these opposites are moved simultaneously, it cannot be that the left is moved by the right remaining stationary, nor vice versa; the original must always be in what lies above both. Therefore, the original seat of the moving soul must be in that which lies in the middle, for of both extremes the middle is the limiting point; and this is similarly related to the movements from above [and below,] those that is from the head, and to the bones which spring from the spinal column, in creatures that have a spinal column.

And this is a reasonable arrangement. For the sensorium is in our opinion in the centre too; and so, if the region of the original of movement is altered in structure through sense-perception and thus changes, it carries with it the parts that depend upon it and they too are extended or contracted, and in this way the movement of the creature necessarily follows. And the middle of the body must needs be in potency one but in action more than one; for the limbs are moved simultaneously from the original seat of movement, and when one is at rest the other is moved. For example, in the line *BAC*, *B* is moved, and *A* is the mover. There must, however, be a point at rest if one is to move, the other to be moved. *A* then being one in potency must be two in action, and so be a definite spatial magnitude not a mathematical point. Again, *C* may be moved simultaneously with *B*. Both the originals then in *A* must move and be, and so there must be something other than them which moves but is not moved. For otherwise, when the movement begins, the extremes, i.e. the originals, in *A* would rest upon one another, like two men putting themselves back to back and so moving their legs. There must then be some one thing which moves both. This something is the soul, distinct from the spatial magnitude just described and yet located therein.

10

Although from the point of view of the definition of movement—a definition which gives the cause—desire is the middle term or cause, and desire moves being moved, still in the material animated body there

μενον μὲν μὴ πεφυκὸς δὲ κινεῖν δύναται πάσχειν κατ' ἀλλοτρίαν δύναμιν· τὸ δὲ κινεῖν ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν τινὰ δύναμιν καὶ ἰσχύν. πάντα δὲ φαίνεται τὰ ζῶα καὶ ἔχοντα πνεῦμα σύμφυτον καὶ ἰσχύοντα τούτῳ. τίς μὲν οὖν ἡ σωτηρία τοῦ συμφύτου πνεύματος, εἴρηται ἐν ἄλλοις· τοῦτο δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν ψυχικὴν ὅμοιος ἔχειν ὥσπερ τὸ ἐν ταῖς καμπαῖς σημείον, τὸ κινεῖν καὶ κινούμενον, πρὸς τὸ ἀκίνητον. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῖς μὲν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ τοῖς δ' ἐν τῷ ἀνάλογον, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ σύμφυτον ἐνταῦθα φαίνεται ὄν. πότερον μὲν οὖν ταυτὸν ἐστὶ τὸ πνεῦμα αἰὲρ ἢ γίνεται αἰὲρ ἕτερον, ἔστω ἄλλος λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων μορίων· φαίνεται δ' εὐφυῶς ἔχον πρὸς τὸ κινητικὸν εἶναι καὶ παρέχειν ἰσχύν. τὰ δ' ἔργα τῆς κινήσεως ὥσιν καὶ ἔλξις, ὥστε δεῖ τὸ ὄργανον αὐξάνεσθαι τε δύνασθαι καὶ συστέλλεσθαι. τοιαύτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ πνεύματος φύσις· καὶ γὰρ ἀβίαστος συστέλλομένη, καὶ βιαστικὴ καὶ ὠστικὴ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν, καὶ ἔχει καὶ βάρος πρὸς τὰ πυρῶδη καὶ κουφότητα πρὸς τὰ ἐναντία. δεῖ δὲ τὸ μέλλον κινεῖν μὴ ἀλλοιώσει τοιοῦτον εἶναι· κρατεῖ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τὰ φυσικὰ σώματα ἀλλήλων, τὸ μὲν κοῦ φον κάτω ὑπὸ τοῦ βαρυτέρου ἀπονικώμενον, τὸ δὲ βαρὺ ἄνω ὑπὸ τοῦ κουφοτέρου.

ὦ μὲν οὖν κινεῖ κινουμένῳ μορίῳ ἡ ψυχὴ, εἴρηται, καὶ δι' ἡν αἰτίαν· ὑποληπτέον δὲ συνεστάναι τὸ ζῶον ὥσπερ πόλιν εὐνομουμένην. ἐν τε γὰρ τῇ πόλει ὅταν ἅπαξ συστήῃ ἡ τάξις, οὐδὲν δεῖ κεχωρισμένου μονάρχου, ὃν δεῖ παρῆναι παρ' ἑκαστον τῶν γινομένων, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ἑκαστος ποιεῖ τὰ αὐτοῦ ὡς τέτακται, καὶ γίνεται τότε μετὰ τόδε διὰ τὸ ἔθος· ἐν τε τοῖς ζώοις τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο διὰ τὴν φύσιν γίνεται καὶ τῷ πεφυκέναι ἑκαστον οὕτω συστάντων ποιεῖν τὸ αὐτοῦ ἔργον, ὥστε μηδὲν δεῖν ἐν ἑκάστῳ εἶναι ψυχὴν, ἀλλ' ἐν τινὶ ἀρχῇ τοῦ σώματος οὐσης τὰλλα ζῆν μὲν τῷ προσπεφυκέναι, ποιεῖν δὲ τὸ ἔργον τὸ αὐτῶν διὰ τὴν φύσιν.

must be some material which itself moves being moved. Now that which is moved, but whose nature is not to initiate movement, is capable of being passive to an external force, while that which initiates movement must needs possess a kind of force and power. Now experience shows us that animals do both possess connatural spirit and derive power from this. (How this connatural spirit is maintained in the body is explained in other passages of our works.) And this spirit appears to stand to the soul-centre or original in a relation analogous to that between the point in a joint which moves being moved and the unmoved. Now since this centre is for some animals in the heart, in the rest in a part analogous with the heart, we further see the reason for the connatural spirit being situate where it actually is found. The question whether the spirit remains always the same or constantly changes and is renewed, like the cognate question about the rest of the parts of the body, is better postponed. At all events we see that it is well disposed to excite movement and to exert power; and the functions of movement are thrusting and pulling. Accordingly, the organ of movement must be capable of expanding and contracting; and this is precisely the characteristic of spirit. It contracts and expands naturally, and so is able to pull and to thrust from one and the same cause, exhibiting gravity compared with the fiery element, and levity by comparison with the opposites of fire. Now that which is to initiate movement without change of structure must be of the kind described, for the elementary bodies prevail over one another in a compound body by dint of disproportion; the light is overcome and kept down by the heavier, and the heavy kept up by the lighter.

We have now explained what the part is which is moved when the soul originates movement in the body, and what is the reason for this. And the animal organism must be conceived after the similitude of a well-governed commonwealth. When order is once established in it there is no more need of a separate monarch to preside over each several task. The individuals each play their assigned part as it is ordered, and one thing follows another in its accustomed order. So in animals there is the same orderliness—nature taking the place of custom—and each part naturally doing his own work as nature has composed them. There is no need then of a soul in each part, but she resides in a kind of central governing place of the body, and the remaining parts live by continuity of natural structure, and play the parts Nature would have them play.

Πῶς μὲν οὖν κινεῖται τὰς ἐκουσίου κινήσεις τὰ ζῶα, καὶ διὰ τίνος αἰτίας, εἴρηται· κινεῖται δὲ τινος καὶ ἀκουσίου ἓν τῶν μερῶν, τὰς δὲ πλείστας οὐχ ἐκουσίου. λέγω δ' ἀκουσίου μὲν οἶον τὴν τῆς καρδίας τε καὶ τὴν τοῦ αἰδοίου πολλάκις γὰρ φανέντος τινός, οὐ μὲντοι κελεύσαντος τοῦ νοῦ κινεῖνται, οὐχ ἐκουσίου δ' οἶον ὕπνον καὶ ἐγρήγορσιν καὶ ἀναπνοήν, καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι τοιαῦταί εἰσιν. οὐθενὸς γὰρ τούτων κυρία ἀπλῶς ἐστίν οὔθ' ἡ φαντασία οὔθ' ἡ ὄρεξις, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἀνάγκη ἀλλοιοῦσθαι τὰ ζῶα φυσικὴν ἀλλοιώσιν, ἀλλοιούμενων δὲ τῶν μορίων τὰ μὲν αὔξεσθαι τὰ δὲ φθίνειν, ὥστ' ἤδη κινεῖσθαι καὶ μεταβάλλειν τὰς πεφυκυίας ἔχεισθαι μεταβολὰς ἀλλήλων. αἰτίαι δὲ τῶν κινήσεων θερμότητές τε καὶ ψύξεις, αἳ τε θύραθεν καὶ αἱ ἐντὸς ὑπάρχουσιν φυσικαί. καὶ αἱ παρὰ τὸν λόγον δὴ γινόμεναι κινήσεις τῶν ῥηθέντων μορίων ἀλλοιώσεως συμπεσοῦσης γίνονται. ἡ γὰρ νόσις καὶ ἡ φαντασία, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, τὰ ποιητικὰ τῶν παθημάτων προσφέρουσι· τὰ γὰρ εἶδη τῶν ποιητικῶν προσφέρουσι. μάλιστα δὲ τῶν μορίων ταῦτα ποιεῖ ἐπιδήλως διὰ τὸ ὥσπερ ζῶον κεχωρισμένον ἑκάτερον εἶναι τῶν μορίων. τούτου δ' αἴτιον ὅτι ἔχουσιν ὑγρότητα ζωτικὴν. ἡ μὲν οὖν καρδία φανερόν δι' ἣν αἰτίαν τὰς γὰρ ἀρχὰς ἔχει τῶν αἰσθήσεων τὸ δὲ μόριον τὸ γεννητικὸν ὅτι τοιοῦτόν ἐστι, σημεῖον· καὶ γὰρ ἐξέρχεται ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὥσπερ ζῶόν τι ἡ τοῦ σπέρματος δύναμις. αἱ δὲ κινήσεις τῇ τε ἀρχῇ ἀπὸ τῶν μορίων καὶ τοῖς μορίοις ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς εὐλόγως συμβαίνουσι, καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλας οὕτως ἀφικνεῖνται. δεῖ γὰρ νοῆσαι τὸ Α ἀρχήν. αἱ οὖν κινήσεις καθ' ἑκάστον στοιχείον τῶν ἐπιγεγραμμένων ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀφικνεῖνται, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς κινουμένης καὶ μεταβαλλούσης, ἐπειδὴ πολλὰ δυνάμει ἐστίν, ἡ μὲν τοῦ Β ἀρχὴ ἐπὶ τὸ Β, ἡ δὲ τοῦ Γ ἐπὶ τὸ Γ, ἡ δ' ἀμφοῖν ἐπ' ἑαυτῇ. ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ Β ἐπὶ τὸ Γ τῷ ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ Β ἐπὶ τὸ Α ἐλθεῖν ὡς ἐπ' ἀρχήν, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ Α ἐπὶ τὸ Γ ὡς ἀπ' ἀρχῆς.

ὅτι δὲ ὅτε μὲν ταῦτα νοησάντων γίνεται ἡ κίνησις ἡ παρὰ τὸν λόγον ἐν τοῖς μορίοις, ὅτε δ' οὐ, αἴτιον τὸ ὅτε μὲν ἐνυπάρχειν τὴν παθητικὴν ὕλην ὅτε δὲ μὴ τοσαύτην ἢ τοιαύτην.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν μορίων ἑκάστου τῶν ζώων, καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς, ἔτι δὲ περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ ὕπνου καὶ μνήμης καὶ τῆς κοινῆς κινήσεως, εἰρήκαμεν τὰς αἰτίας· λοιπὸν δὲ περὶ γενέσεως εἰπεῖν

So much then for the voluntary movements of animal bodies, and the reasons for them. These bodies, however, display in certain members involuntary movements too, but most often non-voluntary movements. By involuntary I mean motions of the heart and of the privy member; for often upon an image arising and without express mandate of the reason these parts are moved. By non-voluntary I mean sleep and waking and respiration, and other similar organic movements. For neither imagination nor desire is properly mistress of any of these; but since the animal body must undergo natural changes of quality, and when the parts are so altered some must increase and other decrease, the body must straightway be moved and change with the changes that nature makes dependent upon one another. Now the causes of the movements are natural changes of temperature, both those coming from outside the body, and those taking place within it. So the involuntary movements which occur in spite of reason in the aforesaid parts occur when a change of quality supervenes. For conception and imagination, as we said above, produce the conditions necessary to affections, since they bring to bear the images or forms which tend to create these states. And the two parts aforesaid display this motion more conspicuously than the rest, because each is in a sense a separate vital organism, the reason being that each contains vital moisture. In the case of the heart the cause is plain, for the heart is the seat of the senses, while an indication that the generative organ too is vital is that there flows from it the seminal potency, itself a kind of organism. Again, it is a reasonable arrangement that the movements arise in the centre upon movements in the parts, and in the parts upon movements in the centre, and so reach one another. Conceive A to be the centre or starting point. The movements then arrive at the centre from each letter in the diagram we have drawn, and flow back again from the centre which is moved and changes, (for the centre is potentially multiple) the movement of B goes to B, that of C to C, the movement of both to both; but from B to C the movements flow by dint of going from B to A as to a centre, and then from A to C as from a centre.

Moreover a movement contrary to reason sometimes does and sometimes does not arise in the organs on the occasion of the same thoughts; the reason is that sometimes the matter which is passive to the impressions is there in sufficient quantity and of the right quality and sometimes not.

And so we have finished our account of the reasons for the parts of each kind of animal, of the soul, and further of sense-perception, of sleep, of memory, and

of movement in general; it remains to speak of animal generation.