


PORPHYRY AND OTHERS ON *PER SE* PREDICATION

the cause in the effect; doctrine of emanation of the species from the genus; teleology of the species being perfected by the differentia) bear a family resemblance to those found in the logical and theological works of Boethius; others, as mentioned above, are strongly reminiscent of the philosophical atmosphere of the *Liber de causis*. Yet the absence of any discussion of predication or the genus–species relation in the *Liber* as it has come down to us obliges us to search elsewhere for the sources of the doctrine attributed to al-Fārābī by Albert.

The extra-Aristotelian doctrines set forth in our passage can, however, be paralleled from elsewhere in Albert's work. In chapter 6 of his *De antecedentibus ad logicam*,<sup>45</sup> the work he placed as an introduction before his commentaries on Aristotle's *Organon*, Albert proceeds to discuss the part of logic that studies simple entities, which can be discovered only by definition or by something resembling it. There are, he tells us, five rules and five corruptions for definitions. The third of these rules is the most interesting for our present purposes: it states that 'what is posited first in the definition is related to that which follows as proximate potentiality to actuality, as what is determined to what determines, and what is distinguished to what distinguishes'.<sup>46</sup> Although Albert makes no mention here of the Porphyrian tree, it may help to picture his thought if we set forth his example, the definition of man (*animal rationale mortale voluntarie mobile*), à la Porphyre:



In this schema, says Albert, each superior step is related to its successor step as potentiality to act, as what is determined to what determines, and as what is distinguished to what distinguishes. Thus, whereas animal is potential, rational is in act; likewise, rational determines and distinguishes animal. The same relation holds true for any two successive levels of the tree's branches.<sup>47</sup> Clearly, we have to do with an ontologized,

45. Cited above, p. 25 and nn. 15–16.

46. Albert, *Super Porphyrium de V universalibus*, p. 12, ll. 10–13 Santos Nova.

47. Compare the metaphysical epistemology of al-Fārābī, e.g. in his *Risāla fi-l-'aql*, in which each degree in the hierarchical levels of being (*tartīb*) is the formal principle for the level following it, and the substrate for the level preceding it. Cf. M. Geoffroy, 'La tradition arabe du *Περὶ νοῦ* d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise', in *Aristotele e Alessandro di Afrodisia nella tradizione araba: atti del colloquio La ricezione araba e ebraica della*